Text linguistics at the millennium 2

E. ‘If I were you...’  

60. For a programmatic illustration, I shall survey some corpus data kindly provided to me by Stephen Bullon, Publishing Manager at COBUILD (Collins Birmingham University International Language Database) in late 1998 and early 1999 from the ‘Bank of English’ at Birmingham University, the world’s largest computerised data corpus, then containing over 329 million words of running text (cf. § 2)

61. I wanted to explore the Conditional colligations ‘if I were’ and ‘if I was’, because they have been items of dispute among teachers of English grammar. My sampling consisted some 800 occurrences out of the total of over 4000 — a partial sample of course, but a week of hard work to sort out all the same. In respect to colligability, I found a strong attraction for the Second Person Pronoun6 ‘you’, and the data indicated why. The coherence of the data was centred on delivering advice (9), a warning (10), or a threat (11), whilst the cohesion was centred on the two exophoric Actors ‘I’ and ‘you’:

(9)     I’d get some sleep if I were you. You’ll need to be up at six to catch the early morning flight from Heathrow.

(10)   The builder looked at it and said, ‘I hope you’re not thinking of filling that thing with water. I wouldn’t if I were you — it’ll go through the floor.’

(11)   The blood of the mob is up! If I were you, I’d clear out of town now with as much as you can carry

The speaker’s intentionality was to imply: ‘I’m not telling you what to do, I’m just telling you what I would do from my own standpoint if I happened to be in your place’. Some leeway is reserved for the acceptability of the hearer who can decline without either side losing face. The informativity is low when the situationality alerts the hearer about what might or should be done. But in some contexts, the advice was clearly improbable and informative, e.g.:

(12)   a girl asked what she could do to stop her boyfriend ejaculating prematurely. ‘If I were you, I would drop him straight away’, came the answer

(13)   ‘I’m thinking of sending my paper to the Journal. Is there room in the next issue?’ Benedict turned to him. ‘If I were you’, he said carefully, but with thickened accent, ‘I would shred it’. Huntley bridled. ‘I beg your pardon?’

When estimating the probabilities of data, we apply our own knowledge of intertextuality being actualised on demand. Someone leaving from harrowing Heathrow Airport had better get plenty of ‘sleep’ (9) in order to survive the ordeal; and someone who has stirred the ‘blood of the mob’ had better ‘clear out of town’ (11). But some ‘girl’ who seeks advice from an agony aunt about her ‘boyfriend’ does not expect to be ordered to ‘drop him straight away’ (12); and someone who has written a ‘paper’ would ‘bridle’ at being told to ‘shred it’ (13).

62. Other pronouns allowed by the cohesion of English were found to be disfavoured by colligability. Whereas ‘if I were you’ appeared in 282 data samples and ‘if I was you’ in 37, others colligations were at best marginal, some hovering between 10 and 20 and some close to or equal to zero. The totals were:

  if I was he              0           if I was she          2           if I was they           0

  if I was him           17          if I was her          5           if I was them         11

  if I were he             3           if I were she         0           if I were they          1

  if I were him          18          if I were her         6           if I were them        10

These data indicate which of the virtual colligations of English cohesion are or are not probable in their colligability for actualisation (§ 53). Interestingly, the probabilities were about even for whether the Verb was in the Indicative ‘was’ or in the (presumably) Subjunctive ‘were’, even though both colligated with the Object Pronoun much more readily than with the Subject Pronoun. Yet when the Pronoun was ‘you’, which does not differentiate between Object and Subject, the old Subjunctive still proved by far the more probable choice. Perhaps this choice is felt to signal a Contrafactual Modality and thus to be more tentative and polite for purposes of face-saving; or perhaps the whole colligation is simply chosen and produced as one frozen unit (compare ‘theory and practice’ in § 98).

63. Several constraints on colligability and collocability appeared when the Conjunction ‘if’ had a meaning like ‘whether’. This meaning colligated with the Indicative ‘was’ — possibly to leave open the question of whether something is Contrafactual — and resisted colligating to the right with a Pronoun. A common collocation to the left was a Verb expressing uncertainty, like ‘ask’, ‘wonder’, or ‘not know’, as in (14-16).

(14)   One day Mrs Luppin remarked that I was looking a little off-colour and asked if I was feeling all right. I told her about my sickness.

(15)   then I got pregnant and I started wondering if I was going to be able to do things right

(16)   I didn’t know if I was going to do this assignment […] But late last night, I decided to.

In such contexts, the Verb ‘see’ never meant ‘perceive with the eye’, nor did ‘tell’ ever mean ‘inform’, although these are the definitions listed as the most probable by conventional dictionaries. Instead, the meaning was ‘find out’ or ‘determine’ as in:

(17)   I wrote seven poems to enter, very much borrowed from the Philip Larkin style. I borrowed his sense of depression, too, so all my friends were phoning to see if I was having a nervous breakdown.

(18)   No one with a gun had shown himself above the roofline but how could I tell if I was being watched?

Such data show how the ‘attractions’ among meanings can influence not just the actualisation of one potential option, but also the actualisation of one potential meaning for the superficially ‘same’ option (cf. § 58). The colligation ‘as if’ colligates in turn with Nouns or Modifiers to the right, and collocates with specified Verbs to the left.

 

F. Intertextual actualisations of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’

 

64. I shall now attempt a less usual demonstration with corpus data, examining how the pair of terms ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are actualised in contemporary English texts, and what the implications might be for situating these pairs within a genuine dialectic. My data were again kindly provided from the ‘Bank of English’ by Stephen Bullon at COBUILD, this time in January 1999.

65. First, we can look at text samples wherein both ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ appeared. The data indicated a cline between the pole of easy connection and the pole of uneasy disconnection.

One data source for easy connection were book titles on a motley variety of topics, such as: Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice; Life Insurance: Theory and Practice; Islam in Theory and Practice; and The Family Interpreted: Feminist Theory in Clinical Practice. Intriguingly, the idea of ‘warfare’ or ‘life insurance’ having their own ‘theory’ intuitively seems informative enough to suggest that the author intended to upgrade and dignify a heavily practical activity (cf. § 93). In return, we might intuitively grant the status of a religion like ‘Islam’ or a philosophy like ‘feminism’ being a ‘theory’, and see the informativity focused upon how they get carried over into ‘practice’ against the contrary trends toward a secular or patriarchal global society.

66. The other main data source for easy connection was found among services offering both ‘theory and practice’ in a package deal. Some were merely trendy, like ‘herbal medicine’ (19), while most were concerned with education, sometimes in specialised fields like ‘accounting’ (20), but often in general education (21-23), which we shall be seeing again (§ 68, 95).

(19)   a course designed to give students instruction in the theory and practice of the use of herbs for medicinal purposes and herbal preparations to maintain healthy skin and hair.

(20)   Financial Reporting explores accounting theory and practice, including such topics as the development and objectives of financial reporting

(21) The practicum is concerned with relating theory and practice, helping prospective teachers to understand and practise a wide range of teaching skills

(22)   the adult education course contained five nights of theory and practice, for three hours each night

(23) The course of study ensures that theory and practice are closely related, providing an opportunity for students to continue with work

These trends can be easily by verified by surfing the Internet. On 14 February 1999, the Alta Vista search engine returned 105,469 home pages for the verbatim collocation ‘theory and practice’. Alongside such frankly pedestrian topics as ‘Good Cooking’, ‘Horse Racing’, ‘Belly Dancing’, and ‘Late Victorian Wallpaper’, I found courses or surveys in ‘Health Activism’, Grading for the Fashion Industry’, ‘Radiometric Calibration’, ‘Rubber Injection Moulding’ ‘Common Object Request Broker Architecture’, and far more others than I have room to list here. This rampant proliferation indicates how empty the terms have become, conveying a vague promise of being comprehensive and thorough (§ 75). At times, the promise sounded distinctly breezy:

(24)   it also helps the student to make the vital connection between esoteric theory and mundane practice, between the future of the planet and the recycled Pepsi can

67. In still other data, the disconnection between of theory and practice was openly acknowledged, though still in confident hopes of a reconnection. One topic was the economic organisation of a society:

(25)   As business starts to bloom in Central and Eastern Europe, theory will increasingly turn into practice.

(26)   The Marxist argument against the separation of theory and practice is well known

Marx himself would have vehemently denied that the ‘separation of theory and practice’ which he strove to overcome could disappear when free-market ‘business starts to bloom’ in formerly ‘socialist’ countries. But then he would have undoubtedly affirmed that the collapse of the polity in those same countries resulted from authoritarian refusals to put the theory of socialism into real practice (Beaugrande, 1997a: 397) (cf. § 80).

68. Toward the middle of the cline shown in Fig. 2 we could put the data indicating that the connection between theory and practice is ‘not clear’ (27) or is open to ‘disagreement’ (28):

(27)   each group allowed to exercise its rights to freedom and self-determination, but it is not clear what this policy will mean in terms of practical politics

(28)   Sometimes members of the community disagree over the practical definitions given to values everybody professes in the abstract, such as liberty or equality

Further along toward the pole of uneasy disconnection was the prospect of ‘fundamental cracks in society’ that are actually ‘widening’:

(29)   the fundamental cracks in both society and theory which were laid bare in the 1960s continue to widen; theory becomes increasingly separated from practice and, thus, incapable of addressing those cracks

Predictably, the social domain suffering the most conspicuously was education, which I often noticed urgently searching for a reconnection, as in:

(30)   addressing the challenge of how we can make comprehensive education work for those for whom theory and practice have remained far apart. That is a debate to relish

(31)   Perhaps the primary benefit of this block was its attempt to link theory with practice. Most teacher preparation programs have a separation

(32)   a cross section of teachers from within school who can apply their learning in situ, bridging the gap between theory and practice by generating theory from practice and practice from theory

(33)   the actors within the school’s unique culture, provided ‘theory for action’ fostering a very different attitude towards theory than the usual presentation of disembodied theory which many teachers experience on external in-service courses

69. A ‘cracked’ society might offer hidden motivations for ‘supporting’ democratic institutions ‘trade unions’ ‘in theory’ whilst ‘destroying’ them ‘in practice’ (34); or for ‘manipulating the theory’ of an institution like the law in order to ‘justify’ one’s ‘perversions’ in ‘practice’ (35).

(34)   In theory, he is a great supporter of trade unions, because, in theory, he’s a socialist, but in practice, he has been the most successful destroyer of trade union power in the British print

(35)   The problem, Mr Olson thinks, is not legal theory but legal practice although lawyers clearly manipulate the former to justify their perversions of the latter.

70. Against my own intuition to approve of connection between theory and practice, some data indicated disapproval:

(36)   The scope of coercive violence was extended: ‘Pornography is the theory, rape is the practice’. ‘Pornography is violence against women’. These made pithy slogans

(37)   Up until that point the proud theory — and the practice of the majority — was that you lived with your family until you met the man you would marry

(38)   It was a symbolic and deferential democracy, but the symbols were rooted in substance: myth became the mortar binding theory and practice

The connection was designedly tendentious for ‘pornography’ and ‘rape’ (36), but merely patriarchal for ‘marriage’ (37) and ‘mythical’ for ‘democracy’ (38). Still, to assert that a ‘myth’ brings ‘substance’ to ‘symbols’ does seem audaciously informative, as does the metaphoric ‘mortar’ suggesting a solidity and strength that are only imaginary.

71. My personal attention was attracted by the topic of ‘war’ or ‘warfare’, whose ‘theory and practice’ we saw being invoked in a book title (§ 65). Some data implied that ‘war’ is essentially a set of ‘practices’ that can be pursued without much interest in ‘theory’ (39); or that the ‘theory’ can be invented after the fact (40).

(39)   he was an independent, practical soldier with a distaste for theory; a fighter who believed that war provided the only lessons of real value to a soldier.

(40)   He did not ‘convert theory into practice’ but exemplified instinctive practice and later derived theory from it. Few soldiers have so impressively

But most of the data concerned an official ‘theory’ expressly devised to justify the practices of warfare such that they will not be recognised to grossly contradict all the humane ideals of the society. Ironically, the author of the most celebrated result, the ‘just war theory’ was a godly philosopher whose sources were eminently theoretical, such as Plantonism (41). Incorporating the ‘Christian position’ on an ‘intellectual’ basis can harmonise this theory with the theory of a ‘holy war’, ‘God’ being squarely on your side (42-43). By emphasising ‘intention’ over  reality, a ‘just war’ can be glibly ‘translated’ into a ‘just peace’, (44); and can project a resounding triumph of ‘good’ over ‘harm’ (45). Yet if the ‘theory’ really requires that ‘every less-violent means be exhausted’ (46) and that ‘provisions be made for innocent civilians’ (47), then no war I can think of has fit its practices to the theory — certainly none in this century.

(41)   Augustine expressed a new attitude toward conflict by formulating the just war theory. He adapted rules of warfare developed by classical thinkers such as Plato and Cicero to the Christian position.

(42)   They forgot how intellectually respectable the Christian theory of holy war once was

(43)   there’s something called a just war theory which is justified an awful lot of wars in the world’s history, where both sides feel they call on God

(44)   one of the seven points of the just war theory is ‘right intention’, and that is sometimes translated as the intention to have a just peace

(45)   the just-war theory clearly requires that the good to be achieved outweighs the harm that is to be done

(46)   Essentially, the just-war theory requires, above all, that every less-violent means be exhausted before war can be justified

(47)   Likewise, the just-war theory requires that there be provisions made for innocent civilians

The real but unofficial theory of modern warfare has been described by Tony Wilden (1987: 27), following Brownmiller (1975), in terms where ‘the power of God’ is equated with limitless violence:

The object is to destroy the will to resist; the target is the entire population; the strategy is terror; the means is torture; the usual end is death; most of the victims are women and children: the worst instrument is rape. To do this you simply let your men loose [with] the power of God over anyone and everyone without a weapon or the strength to fight back. According to the ‘just war theory’, in contrast, the object would be to ‘secure a just peace and the sovereignty and honour of the nation’; the targets are exclusively ‘military installations’; the strategy is ‘tactical manoeuvring’; the means is ‘manly valour’; and the end is the ‘victory of the good side’ (ours). Obviously, the ‘just war theory’ can do wonders for upholding morale and for deflecting world-wide outrage over real atrocities, which can be officially deplored as unfortunate lapses during an otherwise ‘just’ enterprise.

72. This contrast between theories indicates that the official position of governments conducting a war or preparing to do so — of course as a means to ‘keep the peace’ (M. Thatcher) — will embrace the ‘just war theory’ whilst conceding that it is not, or not always, put into ‘practice’ (48-50), due to unforeseen ‘problems’ (50). Improvements in technology are cheerfully expected to establish the connection, e.g., to improve the practices of bombs landing two-thirds of a mile off their targets (51).

(48)   One theme runs throughout, however — the dichotomy between the theory of war and its practice

(49)   As this chapter will endeavour to show, the gap between theory and practice in strategic bombing is wide.

(50)   after only 30 months of war, the original theory of strategic bombing had been stood on its head because of practical problems in carrying out missions

(51)   Warden believed, however, that modem munitions offered a precision that would marry theory and practice. A B-17 bomber in World War II had  a ‘circular error probable’ of 3300 feet, meaning that half of the bombs dropped far from their targets

73. Governments have invoked supportive theories to explain why warfare could not be avoided. My data turned up the ‘domino theory’ (war must be fought here lest neighbouring countries ‘fall’ to the enemy) (52-53), and the ‘deterrence theory’ (54) (continual threat of war is needed to deter your enemies from war). Both theories were heavily exploited during the Cold War, especially in Southeast Asia (53), yet the armaments for war were illogically retained after Cold War had ended (54).

(52)   ‘We were faced with the Cold War and the domino theory," the 60-year-old former national serviceman said     

(53)   He [Nixon] mined harbors, talked about ‘decisive military action to end the war’, and used the domino theory to justify the need to stop communism in Vietnam.

(54)   Ordinary people, including those who subscribed to the deterrence theory during the cold war, are angry that politicians have not taken the opportunity to move towards a nuclear-free world

The all-time prize for public mystification was surely earned by the ‘limited war theory’ (55-58) concocted to justify the lavish preparations for war after nuclear weapons had foreclosed the chances of surviving, let alone winning. This theory was obliged either to ignore ‘the enemy’s response’ (57) or to naively imagine the sort of enemy whose thinking is entirely guided by game theory (58).

(55)   How can conflict be waged between nuclear-armed adversaries without leading to mutual destruction? Limited war theory attempts to provide a framework

(56)   We had to invent a theory that would allow us to fight on the edges without nuclear technology. This theory is called ‘limited war’. Its premise is that we and the Soviets can wage little wars, and that each side will refrain from going nuclear

(57)   And in the event of a conventional attack the scenario was for the first use of battlefield weapons to keep the nuclear war limited and contained. That was the theory. But there was no account taken of the enemy’s response

(58)   Limited war theory had been built on the assumption that the opponent was cautious and value-maximizing, not fanatically determined

The basic premise of this theory — which I have never once heard anyone seriously defend  — is vastly more remote from real practices than anything imagined by Plato or St. Augustine: a ‘superpower’ with an staggering stockpile of nuclear armaments would refrain from using these even in times of utmost desperation, and tamely accept defeat, humiliation, and dispossession by the rival ‘superpower’ who, the propaganda machines have insisted, is the very incarnation of evil. If the ‘Soviets rejected’ such an absurd theory (59), then they were ‘motivated’ as much by common sense as by ‘escalation theory’.

(59)   bringing in escalation theory from political context is the fundamental motivation behind Soviet rejection of many aspects of limited war theory. This is crucial, because if a war is to be limited in scope through deliberate restraint

A far more accurate label would have been ‘substituted war theory’, where the ‘little wars’ (56) between two or more clients of the ‘superpowers’ allow the latter to stereotype short of the logical end-game of ‘mutual destruction’ (55). Vietnam was supposed to be one such substituted war, but it didn’t go according to the ‘theory’ of the superpowers for ‘limited war’ (60), precisely because the ‘enemy’s response’ was ‘fanatically determined’.

(60)   Vietnam saw the application of many of these ideas. Whether or not the Americans were consciously applying limited war theory, many of the concepts underlying and shaping their policy were the same as those shaping limited war theory

74. I have focused on the topic of ‘warfare’ as a conspicuous demonstration of how an official ‘theory’ can get ‘theorised’ not to account for the real practices, but to provide a camouflage for the real theory. I suspect many far less conspicuous parallels could be found wherever the real theory that would actually account for the real practices would be inadmissible in a modern democratic society. If so, the apparent global trends toward ‘democracy’ from the 1960s onward might be grasped as a ‘re-theorising’ of post-war societies that transformed official theories whilst leaving the real practices largely unchanged (see Beaugrande, 1997a for extensive discussion and references). 

G. Intertextual actualisations of ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ 

75. The corpus data for samples wherein both ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ appeared did not reflect the same trends as those with ‘theory and practice’ in any straightforward way, but parallels could be detected. The collocation ‘theoretical and practical’ was often enlisted to enhance the commercial or professional value of some essentially practical activity or training by implying that it is comprehensive or thorough (cf. § 66):

(61)   The program will incorporate theoretical and practical training within the school’s own commercially-operated hotel, just outside Canberra.

(62)   the weekend is designed to give Queensland’s food and wine professionals and serious amateurs access to the latest information, practical and theoretical.

(63)   Media Studies, National Certificate. This course gives a basic introduction, both theoretical and practical, in media studies as a starting point for a career in this area

(64)   The course is both theoretical and practical with the emphasis once again on gaining real experience under the guidance of a senior BBC Radio Trainer.

The collocation was also enlisted to suggest the serious nature of one’s deliberations:

(65)   This chapter is concerned with the practical and theoretical implications of seeing ‘child abuse’ as a matter of men’s violence to babies, children, and young people

(66) More recently there has been a renewed interest in fundamental social problems such as poverty, and a search, both on the practical and on the theoretical level, for explanations of the persistence of problems despite the rise of institutional welfare.

Criminology presented an interesting exception: either remaining ‘reticent’ about awkward matters that were both ‘theoretical and practical’ (67)  or else shunting them off into ‘ethical’ matters in order to profess ‘neutrality’ in both ‘theory and practice’ (68).

(67)   has often been ignored or avoided by critical criminologists. Carlen has observed that there is a ‘radical reticence about theoretical and practical questions concerning the desirability, recognition, denial and concomitant control of the power to punish’.

(68)   Most criminologists are engaged in theoretical and practical projects without considering their ethical implications. They believe that they can be ethically neutral

This aspiration is quite natural in view of the questionable ethics of ‘punishment’ (not to mention the endemic beatings, rape, and torture in our prisons) in a society whose official theory is to ‘rehabilitate criminals’.

76. Where the data indicated some uneasy disconnection, the ‘theoretical’ was typically disapproved and the ‘practical’ was approved:

(69)   Those experiences were of crucial importance to me, for they removed my evolving approach from a purely theoretical context and re-rooted it in a practical theatrical foundation

(70) These are not theoretical niceties, they are fundamental practical moves forward in market-led strategic change

(71)   Perhaps most distressing is the continued emphasis on theoretical academic work, not practical or technical skills needed for the marketplace.

(72)   most of the courses echo a ‘cut-the-crap’ utilitarianism. Background details, historical origins and theoretical models give way to practical understanding-and-doing-skills.

Compare this glowing vision of a ‘practical man’ being nearly superhuman:

(73) He was a talented, capable, practical man, articulate, imaginative and resourceful, the sort of person who could be relied upon to cope with any situation

Some of the data were less obvious, but a bias toward the practical might still be inferred:

(74)   But it is fair to say that today, in general, the environment’s own standing has become more of a matter of theoretical and spiritual interest than a real practical constraint on the bringing of environmental litigation

(75)   he also spoke of freedom in terms which party critics like Roy Hattersley might endorse as being dependent not just on theoretical choice ‘but on the practical ability to exercise it, the freedom to work and develop talent’

(76)   These medical schools, often controlled by a church hostile to any birth control, enrolled almost no women, and stressed theoretical expertise rather than the practical knowledge embodied in folk medicine.

‘Theoretical interest’ by itself won’t accomplish much to save the ‘environment’ (74), ensure ‘freedom’ (75), or improve the ‘control’ of 'women’ over their own lives (76).

77. Occasional data recommended a clear decision for the one side or the other:

(77)   there was nothing for it but to distinguish sharply between the theoretical man, who seeks understanding, and the practical man, who feels compelled to take political action

(78)   In an age of specialists, the organizational aspects of mathematics function more tidily if people specialize either in the theoretical areas of the subject or its practical ones. Because most people feel happier working in one or the other of these two styles

In still other data, connecting theoretical to the practical was advocated, though the prospects might seem dubious:

(79)   if the lesson of history is that strong links between theoretical research and practical applications are a key factor in scientific progress, the effort to bring the two together is crucial

(80)   though not led directly by Marxist theory, they partially demonstrated the correctness of that theory, showed that socialism was a practical possibility and not just the theoretical result of idle speculation by intellectuals who had no firm grasp of the realities

(81) the method of ‘sociological intervention’ aims to open social movement participants’ eyes to the wider theoretical significance of their practical activity and thereby to catalyse the movements’ potential for creating a new type of society

So far, we are left to assume, science has failed to ‘bring together research and applications’ (79); ‘socialism’ has been mainly ‘speculation’ divorced from ‘realities’ (80); and ‘sociological intervention’ has brought us no nearer to ‘a new type of society’ (81). If, as I would surmise, such failures are related to the endemic disconnections of modern democratic society (§ 74), expecting a total change seems, well, impractical.

78. When either ‘theoretical’ or ‘practical’ occurred without the other term, some differences in collocability could be readily noticed. The term ‘theoretical’ collocated in titles or descriptions with distinctly academic topics, such as ‘mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology genetics, physiology, anatomy, physiology, economics, psychotherapy’. In contrast, ‘practical’ collocated with distinctly non-academic topics such as ‘photography, seamanship, suturing, cooking, dining, woodworking, gardening, summer pruning of tree fruit’. Equally remote from academic concerns were books offering ‘practical’ advice like these:

(82)   this extremely practical book which mixes common-sense advice with many trade secrets gleaned from extensive experience

(83)   Courtship: Wisdom For Wooers And The Wooed offers practical guidance on condom etiquette, cheating, children, and, toughest of all, how to introduce your other half

If, like me, you are puzzled about why ‘introducing your other half’ should be ‘tougher’ than rearing ‘children’, you’ll have to buy the book to find out.

79. The uses of ‘theoretical’ for academic topics were most pronounced when collocated with ostentatious technical terms, e.g.:

(84)   In technical-theoretical parlance, countries are required to have factor endowments in the same cone of diversification

(85)   Bio-inorganic chemistry: experimental and theoretical studies of speciation involved in trace element bio-availability, and pharmaceutical trace metal interaction

The link between ‘theoretical’ and authority was intensely emblematic when opposed to ‘rampant empiricism’ (86) or when traced back to the ‘features of language’ suitable for ‘sounding expert’ (87).

 (86)  Rampant empiricism without a firm grounding in theoretical structures will result in  multiple research projects with fragmented yield and low efficiency

(87)   how they are perceived on some ‘authority scale’ might influence how the audience receives their experimental report or theoretical argument. They know they have to sound ‘expert’. However, they haven’t really figured out which features of language

The term ‘theoretical’ itself was evidently thought to be one such ‘feature of language’, witness its actualisations to lend some intellectual respectability to dubious topics:

(88)   ‘Psychoenergetics in Theoretical and Practical Aspects’, in Proceedings of the Third International Congress on Psychotronic Research.

(89) ‘Reincarnation Field Studies and Theoretical Issues’, in B. Wolman, ed., Handbook of Parapsychology

(90)   To escape from this state Machen put his theoretical knowledge of occultism to practical use, and after using a ‘process’ that seems to have been some sort of magic

The term was also actualised to make unpleasant realities seem more abstract, such as tolerance of immigrants (91), profiteering by means of non-existent ‘capital’ (92), and ‘death’ by ‘cancer’ (93). Warfare popped up again for a ‘theoretical’ intervention in Africa (94), where the ‘relief’ did not include food, water, or medical supplies, but manpower and technology, presumably to ‘relieve’ the endangered power-holders who safeguard European interests.

(91)   However, until immigrants began arriving in the mid-1980s, this tolerance was a largely theoretical exercise.

(92)   the stockmarket boom inflated their theoretical capital to phenomenal levels

(93) However, the same assumptions that underpin calculations of ‘theoretical deaths’ also predict an increased risk of fatal cancer in direct proportion to the increase in body weight.

(94)   A theoretical taskforce of soldiers, warships, and military aircraft was sent to carry out a relief mission in an imaginary African country

80. The corpus data prominently represented two ‘theoretical’ fields. Astronomy was a favoured topic because so much of it remains hypothetical, due to the vast distances, masses, energies, and time lapses involved in stars or galaxies:

(95)   Crawford admits that these ideas are theoretical and highly speculative. ‘I haven’t a clue how faster-than-light travel or communication might be achieved’.

(96)   This provides a picture of the ‘Multi-verse’, as some call this theoretical froth of universes. Because conditions in the black holes are so extreme, even the laws of physics might change

On the other hand, socialism was a ‘theoretical’ topic because humans can put it into practice only if the society equitably redistributed its resources, and the holders of power are grimly determined to achieve just the opposite. The data showed people preferring to view ‘socialism’ as a ‘very distant objective’ (97), far ‘withdrawn from the common-sense world’ (98). In response, the advocates of socialism were found mistrusting the purely ‘theoretical’ and striving to gain a firm foundation upon the ‘social experiences of the community’ (99) and to reconcile the ‘theoretical work of intellectuals’ with the ‘manual labour of proletarians’ by sharing a ‘practical’ stance (100). The irony seems consummate if the ‘working class’ attained a ‘theoretical position’ that ‘disconcerted’ the academic ‘labour theorists’ (101).

(97)   Despite Ramsay MacDonald’s commitment to a Labour Party whose theoretical aim was to transform capitalism into socialism, as leader of the party he saw this as some very distant objective

(98)   Her [Hannah Arendt’s] thought is a kind of reflection that deals with essences, with what is most abstract, general, and theoretical — and it involves ‘withdrawal from the common-sense world of appearances.’

(99)   political wisdom is not to be found in the theoretical speculations of isolated thinkers but in the historically accumulated social experiences of the community

(100) By the same token, the theoretical work of intellectuals was thought to be no less practical than the manual labour of proletarians

(101) labour theorists of the period were aware of and disconcerted by the fact that the working class was developing its own theoretical position on the nature of society — a position that was antagonistic to the interests of established society

81. As with so many terms, my two here have been appropriated for consumerism, witness the breezily offered ‘theory and practice’ of ‘wine’ and ‘hotels’ (61-62). Collocated directly with a commodity, ‘theoretical’ appeared just once and in a weird context (102), the intended meaning being ‘intellectual’, I would assume. But ‘practical’ collocated with all sorts of commodities, including ‘shoes’, ‘cameras’, and ‘tableware’ along with some whose ‘practicality’ might well be doubted (103-04).

(102)   these theoretical disco records blended morbid introspection and exotic rhythms

(103)   from our brochures showing a wide range of colourful and practical items, the upholstery with practical zip-on covers for the flame-retardant foam cushions

(104)   Another tip is to look through the peculiar catalogues that drop through the letter box and out of magazines. Practical ideas abound. A portable plastic bidet, for example. Once they are the proud possessors of this ingenious receptacle

I would rather not picture the ‘practices’ of the ‘proud possessors’ in (104)! 

H. Into the millennium 

82. The corpus data adduced above of course do not cover the entire range of ways in which two pairs of terms ‘theory and practice’ and ‘theoretical and practical’ are being actualised in contemporary English texts, but do suggest some significant tendencies worthy of further research. Such data undeniably let us observe what language looks like when it is being used (cf. § 1), and to exploit texts by letting them represent themselves (§ 42). We confront neither Saussure’s ‘mass’ of merely ‘accessory and accidental facts’ plus Chomsky’s ‘fragments and deviant expressions’, nor again the latter’s ‘completely homogeneous speech-community’ (§ 3f). The data reflect an ongoing dialectic between the ‘heterogeneity’ within the ‘speech-community’ and the ‘homogeneity’ encouraged by shared participation in text-events.

83. This dialectic embraces us text linguists as well, since we belong, in our private lives, to the community of English speakers being enticed with ‘foam cushions’ and ‘plastic bidets’ (103-04) along with books of advice on how to ‘cheat’ on our spouses (using a ‘portable bidet’ to purge the evidence?) and how to give ‘introductions’ (81) so that likely candidates to ‘cheat’ with might think we’re single. In our professional lives, we can productively invest our own status as participants in analysing or interpreting textual data produced for the community (§ 48). Doing so should help to keep our own texts free of the complacent or obscure abstractions that imply having some privileged access to the ‘perfect knowledge’ of the ‘ideal speaker’ (§ 4, 29, 34,  38), or purporting to miraculously restore the pristine, ideal order which ‘actual speech’ had converted into disorder (§ 22).

84. Yet our efforts to achieve the viewpoint of Firth’s ‘typical participants in some generalised context of situation’ (§ 9) must remain continual work in progress. Exploring corpus data is the most effective means I have found for checking and enhancing the ‘typicality’ of my own English, though I shall never get finished. I have repeatedly noticed areas where my own usage was at best incomplete and at worst plain wrong, but most often just too vague. This finding is quite natural even for a ‘Professor of English’, because, like everyone else, I have had only a limited range of real-life occasions for saying things (cf. § 31). I can discuss the ‘theory and practice of education’ and frequently have, but I would be hopelessly lost in discussing the ‘theory and practice’ of ‘belly dancing’ or ‘rubber injection moulding’ (§ 66).

85. Throughout my career, I have suspected that most disagreements among linguists stemmed not from their official disputes about theory-building, e.g., whether the ‘semantics’ should be ‘interpretive’ or ‘generative’, but from their uneven capacities or dispositions for interpreting language data. The unevenness might reflect the conscious or unconscious striving of some linguists to isolate a Saussurian ‘langue’ or a Chomskyan ‘competence’ whilst seeming to disappear behind data deliberately invented to be so trivial — like ‘the man hit the ball’ — that they seem to interpret themselves. Such linguists look like they’re struggling to forget or cancel the fact that they themselves are speakers and listeners who continually navigate between ‘langue and parole’, or between ‘competence and performance’ and who are therefore not positioned to isolate the one side from the other. Moreover, since ordinary language experience is not mainly the interpretation of trivial isolated sentences, their results are hardly likely to be representative of anyone’s ‘competence’, let alone the whole community’s.

86. My professional situation has been decisively coloured by my own academic history. My work in linguistics began with the translation of poetry (Beaugrande, 1971, 1978), which has trained me to squeeze a great deal of interpretation out of the data put before me, because as a translator I must base my concrete practices upon my own interpretation of the original text. So I was never deeply impressed with the kinds of ‘theoretical linguistics’ that shied away from practices and retreated either into invented sentences or arid formalisms, though I only gradually came to appreciate why the whole enterprise is fundamentally misconceived, as I have explained here.

87. My later work has been concentrated in language education in a broad sense. I have thus become extremely sensitive to variations and uncertainties in and about the usage of English, which I can see creating serious obstacles for prospective learners or teachers of English. Indeed, the inequalities in access to English world-wide are currently a major engine of those social and economic inequalities that our ‘modern democracies’ officially claim to have overcome (Beaugrande, 1997a, 1999b). So my own interest in corpus data is firmly situated in a larger search for new directions and initiatives in a millennium which will undoubtedly decide who may or may not speak or be heard.

88. Again, I have good reason to mistrust a ‘linguistics’ proclaiming that speech cannot be studied’ (§ 3). If, as Saussure acknowledged, ‘the viewpoint creates the object’, then we have no use for the Chomskyan ‘ideal speaker’, who has no viewpoint at all. What text linguists must do is search our data for signs of  convergence of viewpoints among the community instead of glibly making our own personal viewpoint supply all the norms and standards. Hjelmslev was misled: ‘the linguistic investigator is not given’ ‘the as yet unanalysed text (§ 7) but the actualised text; and until I re-actualise it, I am given nothing at all. And if (as he vowed) ‘linguistic theory must also cover texts as yet unrealised’ (§ 7), then the theory must equip us for engaging with the texts that are realised.

89. So my enterprise hinges vitally upon gathering extensive data about the was in which different people’s actualisations may converge or diverge. We thus return to the critical dependence of text upon intertext which, I have argued, turns our attention in the opposite direction from seeing the text as a set or sequence of sentences (cf. § 14, 35, 59). By examining sets of related choices across large numbers of texts, we can finally rescue ‘intertextuality’ from the theoretical and practical limbo where the arcane adumbrations of post-structuralism had located it, and can make tractable estimates of what is more or less probable about specified combinations. Similarly, we can finally grasp the text as a genuine intersystemic event — internally systemic in the mutual ‘attractions’ among options, and also externally systemic in the tuning of those probabilities through other texts within the intertext (§ 21). These options form the ‘networks’ that are more open than any one actual text yet more closed than any virtual system of a language  (§ 27).

90. How far an intertext might extend is, at this stage, totally unclear in theory. In practice, you come to a trade-off between increasing the delicacy of your survey by increasing the quantity of data versus keeping the presentation of your findings from becoming too bulky to be manageable or indeed publishable (cf. Sinclair, 1998: 82). I tend to level out with around one hundred samples culled out of larger data set; for the data cited the present study, I scrutinised some 1600 samples. But we need to form very large teams to examine correspondingly large samplings whose size and range can be decided by practical goals, such as providing a browsers’ corpus for self-paced learners of  English as a Foreign Language (Beaugrande, 1997b, 1998c),

91. A comparable trade-off between delicacy and quantity applies to the length of your individual samples. The default length in the Bank of English search programme when I used it in July 1994 was 80 characters, with the key word or words roughly in the centre, but I rapidly found this inadequate. The context rarely settles down in any informative delicacy at less than twice that many, and my samplings for this study, provided by the patient Mr Bullon, were roughly 200 characters, rounded up to begin and end with complete words. Even that much is far from ideal, and my selection of data to present was partly steered by the reliable delicacy of contexts at the specified length. This too is a merely practical and somewhat adventitious artefact, to be overcome when our resources allow.

92. All these factors set the context for composing the present text about ‘theory and practice’: in society, in education, in science, in linguistics, and finally in a modest sampling of contemporary texts. I have sought to build a case to support my assertion that human practices, including ones with texts, are necessarily ‘theoretical’, but the underlying theories are largely implicit and unrecognised. In return, official theories are constantly being constructed and promulgated to satisfy the aspirations of a society of social group to regard itself as human, fair, equitable, rational, and so on. Evidence to the contrary can be expediently ‘theorised out’, especially by classifying it all as individual accidents or mishaps which are (of course) deplorable but which do not discredit an official theory.

93. I have proposed to describe the textual data along a cline ranging from easy connection to uneasy disconnection between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (§ 65). Some data confirmed my intuition of disconnections whose purport would be: ‘in theory it should be like this but in practice it’s not’. Yet some other data implied either that a connection can be taken for granted (‘just buy this book and you’ll see’), or else that it has not yet been achieved but can be and should be (‘just enrol in our all-new training course’). Often, ‘theory and practice’ or ‘theoretical and practical’ seemed to convey little more than a vague and mystified promise to be comprehensive or thorough in dealing with matters as diverse as ‘Horse Racing’, ‘Late Victorian Wallpaper’, ‘Health Activism’, or ‘Grading for the Fashion Industry’ (§ 66). The mystification could be more easily noticed if ‘practice’ were taken out, e.g., if you proposed to enlighten the world on the ‘theory of belly dancing’ or on ‘theoretical wine’.

94. In general, ‘theory’ or ‘theoretical’ collocated with the lexical items for academic topics, whereas ‘practice’ or ‘practical’ collocated with those for non-academic topics, especially commodities (§ 78f). In respect to attitudes, ‘theoretical’ was approved for academic contexts of ‘sounding expert’ and authoritative (§ 79), but disapproved in contexts of being abstruse or unrealistic (§ 76). In contrast, ‘practical’ was nearly always was approved, e.g. for a ‘man’ who was ‘talented, capable’, and ‘resourceful’ (73).

95. The most consistent preoccupations — and those with which, for the reasons given here, I felt the greatest resonance — were found for the topic of education (§ 66, 68). There, a ‘separation’ (31) or a ‘gap’ (32) was admitted along with cheerful projects to reconnect: to banish ‘disembodied theory’ (33) and (more bluntly) to ‘cut the crap’ (72). The sheer convergence among these data indicate that the prospects are dim: if centuries of efforts have not failed to connect up the theory and practice of education, what can you hope to achieve, say, in ‘five nights’ (22)? The failures of education cannot even be understood as long as they ‘theorised out’ as individual mishaps of pupils being ‘lazy’, ‘undisciplined’, ‘disobedient’, and so on.

96. The real (but unofficial) theory of ‘modern education’ derives from the persistent assumptions that the main objective must be the passive absorption of theoretical knowledge about topics like ‘algebra’; and that the proportions of ‘right and wrong answers’ in ‘test’ situations are the most valid measures of individual ‘achievement’. Such assumptions could explain why conventional education, both in its theories and in its practices, has remained so insulated from the theories and practices of social and professional life in rapidly changing societies. This insulation is usually accepted as a self-explanatory precondition for education even though it instils pervasive doubts about relevance which severely alienate many teachers and learners. No significant improvements can occur whilst education is enlisted in the crucial disconnection of ‘modern democracy’ to sustain equality in theory and inequality in practice (Apple, 1984; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986; Beaugrande, 1997a). We will need a full-scale ‘curriculum transformation’ for a ‘better linking of theory and practice to improve everyone’s learning, by combining study with work, by a more democratic restructuring of schools, and closer links with their communities’ (van Rensburg, 1994: 130).

97. The double-tracking of our societies and their institutions has been faithfully reflected in a ‘modern linguistics’ that ‘theorises out’ of ‘language’ the practical realities of human interaction. The resulting idealisations, misleadingly still called ‘language’, are not just empirically vacuous and scientifically invalid, but also socially irresponsible insofar as they have denied to society the insights needed to promote equality and democracy in and through language. Here too, a sweeping transformation is urgently needed to bring real language back into the centre; and, for the reasons I have sought to expound, we can reliably do so only by surveying very large corpora of actualised texts.

98. The analytic or descriptive tools of linguistics can be productively enlisted as theoretical guidelines for practical goals. I can only pick out some salient points to illustrate here. The word-order ‘theory and practice’ is quite frozen. The reversed order ‘practice and theory’ appeared on a mere 8 home-pages of the Internet (compared to the 105,469 noted in § 66), and all but one of these came from a single source, namely the ‘1st International Conference on the Practice and Theory of Automated Timetabling’ in Edinburgh in 1995. Either the normal word-order is simply treated as one invariable unit; or the first item is also the one ranked higher than the second (compare Cooper and Ross, 1975, on ‘world order’). The second explanation does not fit the attitudes I have noted above. Nor is it plausible in view of the far more comparable home-page proportions of 28,743 for ‘theoretical and practical’ and 8361 for ‘practical and theoretical’. Either way, these two sets of home-pages were almost all academic or educational, often on austere topics, such as ‘optimal input filter design’ or ‘uncertainty and complexity in automated knowledge acquisition’. Nothing so mundane as ‘horse racing’ or ‘belly dancing’.

99. The probabilities of local colligations and collocations were better defined in the corpus data, which are propagated under different conditions from Internet home-pages. At one end, the probability proved high for the fixed collocation ‘theory and practice’ to collocate with lexical options from the topic of education, such as ‘course’ (21-22, 33, 63-64, 71), ‘teacher’ (21, 31-33), and ‘student’ (19, 23-24). At the other end were the extremely improbable combinations like ‘theoretical disco records’ (102) and ‘theoretical froth of universes’ (96), or ‘practical guidance on condom etiquette’ (83) and ‘practical portable plastic bidet’ (104). Still, neither end of the probability scale could be captured in term of ‘rules’ for the ‘grammaticalness’ or ‘well-formedness’ of ‘sentences’, all of which would be at inappropriate degrees of abstraction (cf. § 18, 41); yet our competence is not overly taxed by interpreting the data in context, thanks to the ‘systemic’ nature of texts (§21). Here too, I would conclude that intuition operates most smoothly after the fact (§ 31).

100. John Sinclair (1991: 495), a grand pioneer of corpus linguistics, has remarked that ‘the variations are much more interesting than the regularities’. My own interest has been most piqued by the active dialectic between variation and regularity, or in Saussurian terms, between ‘collective usage’ and ‘individual freedom’ (§ 11). The influence of collocability and colligability often applies not to some specific choice (such as ‘course’) but to some category of choices, such as the set of commodities that are advertised to be ‘practical’ because, like ‘shoes’ or ‘cameras’ (§ 81), the practicality of some brands might be doubted. Even ostentatiously arcane combinations like ‘trace element bio-availability’ would fall under the terms of ‘bio-inorganic chemistry’ (85), and the intentionality may well may be to convey more scientific authority  than, say, ‘how new species are formed when trace elements are available’. The acceptability of readers is compelled, though they might well prefer, say,  to read not (86) but (86a):

(86) Rampant empiricism without a firm grounding in theoretical structures will result in multiple research projects with fragmented yield and low efficiency

(86a) Empiricism lacking a theoretical basis will lead to fragmented and inefficient research projects

The high degrees of informativity in science texts are often merely apparent and masked behind obscure modes of expression (cf. Bazerman, 1988).

101. Word-order might be iconic for the packaging of commodities like the ‘flame-retardant foam cushions’ (103) which do burn but not so fast as others and are displayed here like rubbery fire-wardens; or like ‘Reincarnation Field Studies’ (89) which slyly packages imagination with observation. Or, parallelism in word-order can mark a contrast, e.g., ‘between the theoretical man, who seeks understanding, and the practical man, who feels compelled to take political action’ (77); or a contrast that one aspires to resolve, e.g., between ‘the theoretical work of intellectuals’ versus ‘the manual labour of proletarians’ (100). Or again, word order can regulate informativity by guiding focus, e.g., toward ‘a  key factor in scientific progress’ for which our ‘effort’ is ‘crucial’ (79); or by evading the problems of Agency through a Passive when ‘political wisdom’ is ‘found’ (by whom?) ‘in the historically accumulated social experiences of the community’ (99). Such data show some of the many ways whereby grammar can as the ‘front end’ for textual and intertextual motives in choosing and arranging words and word-classes (§ 18).

102. Such then are some prospects I see for text linguistics as we head into for the next millennium, ready or not. Now that we have access to very large corpora of authentic texts, the ‘linguistic’ issues I have aired and numerous related ones can be reassessed from the bottom-up. Some major problems, though far from solved, are finally being recognised and placed on the agenda, pending the solutions that will require extensive explorations of data. Moreover, the textual aspects of social and cultural issues can be expansively explored, such as education and science. The delicate links between ‘language’ and ‘text’ — many of them still ‘missing’ from our established theory and models — are also the most precise regulators of nearly all significant human theories and practices. And, because language partially constitutes what it postulates (§ 45), and because the actualisation of a text participates in constructing a ‘world’ (§ 25), the linkage will do much to decide the future evolution of societies already caught up in swift and epochal transformations.    

 

Notes  

1.    This problem of ‘complexity’ was also aired in Dascal and Margalit’s (1974: 85) ‘critical view of text grammars’, but their solution was simply to stay with ‘sentence grammar’.

2.    Hartmann’s (1963: 91) own term for the virtual was ‘potential’. In another volume, Hartmann (1964: 51, my translation) expressed concern lest the pair of terms render the ‘main term “system”’ unduly ‘vague’, and he proposed instead the pair ‘system’ for the ‘potential’ and ‘complex’ for the ‘actual’. But for us the term ‘complex’ must seem too overloaded with other associations, especially due to the recent prominence of ‘complexity theory’.

3.    Harweg’s proposal (following K.L. Pike’s ‘unified theory’) to recognise the ‘emic text’ alongside the ‘etic text’ points in a similar direction, except that ‘emic’ was defined to be ‘language-internal’ and ‘etic’ to be ‘language-external’ (1968: 152, my translation). I doubt whether this distinction can be sustained in a comprehensive description of authentic texts.

4.    In this early passage, the wording was ‘finite or infinite’ but in Chomsky’s subsequent formulations we consistently find ‘infinite’.

5.    I recall Hartmann using the term in our discussions, though I could not find it in his landmark volume Theorie der Sprachwissenschaft (1963).

6.    Grammatical terms are written in upper case throughout for easy recognition.

 

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